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ABSTRACT
Thepurpose of thispaperis to address theroleof endogenous default penalties
that arecontingentupon the intensity of default on the part of the borrowing nation,
andto evaluate the effectsof contingency plansthat make the interest rate
dependentupon variables that are correlated with thedefault penalty. This is done by
consideringan economywherea default will trigger avariable cost whose magnitude
isdetermined by theIntensity of default. We design alternative incentive schemesby
varyingthe responsiveness of the penalty to the intensity ofdefault, without
changing the total cost applied in case of a complete default. At the limitour
incentivescheme converges to an exogenous default cost regime. We derivethe
supply of credit for the case where there is uncertainty regarding the total default
cost,andwe evaluate the dependency of the supply curve on the incentive scheme. A
rise in the elasticity of the penalty withrespect to the default intensity is Shown to
induce a higher default rate and to raise the country risk as reflected in the
interest rate associated with agiven borrowing, causing aleftward shift in the
supply of credit. Using the expected welfare of a representative consumer it is shown
thatthe introduction of partial defaults due to a variablepenalty has adverse
effects. Thus, our study concludes that variable defaultschemes that tie the penalty
to the default rate are disadvantageous. We turn then toan assessment of the welfare
effect of plans that make the Interest ratecontingent upon realization of shocks. In
general. suchacontingency plan is advantageous. For example, a plan that will index
the interest rate suchasto correlate it perfectly with the default penalty eliminates
the adverse effects of country risk onexpected income. For such an economy a
contingency plan that will index the effective interest rate to the realization ofthe
terms of trade will be beneficial in reducing the effectivemagnitude of country risk
and the Incidence of default.
Joshua Aizenman
1101 East 58th Street
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
Chicago, IL 60637
(312)962—7260L INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The adverse supply shocks of the 1970's triggered substantial borrowings by
L.D.C.'s and Latin American countries. The accumulated borrowings have changed the
country risk characteristics of the borrowing nations, which have foundservicin9
theirdebt a challenging task. In the 1980's various countries have engaged in debt
rescheduling ,whereasothers have found that new borrowings involve a significant
risk premium'. Consequently, attention has been focussed on the design of credit
policies and the role of institutions in the presence of country risk. Recently we
have observed initialattempts to design payment plans that will make the effective
interest rate paid by the borrowing nation contingent upon its terms of trade2. These
circumstanceshave raised Important questions regarding the design of incentive
schemes for the borrowing nations. Such schemes should enhance the borrowing
nations' incentives to service their debt, thereby reducing the risk premium charged
for a 9iven credit volume and allowing smoother operation of the international
credit market, The purpose of this paper is to address two policy Issues related to
the design of incentives. We address first the role of endogenous default penalties
that are contingent upon the intensity of default undertaken by the borrower nation,
andthen we evaluate the effects ofcontingency plans that make the interest rate
dependent upon variables that are correlated with the default penalty.
In general, the supply of credit is determined by the nature of the expected
default penalty. A default may trigger two types of penalties. The first is
exogenously fixed, and Its magnitude Is independent of the intensity of default. The
secondisvariable, and Its magnitude is determined by the intensity of default. This
paper starts by addressing a positive issue--assessing the dependency of the supply
of credit on the elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default intensity. This
sets the stage for the normative discussion. The first policy Issue addressed Is the
welfare implications of contingent default penalties. We turn then to an assessment
of the welfare effect of contingent interest rates In the presence of country risk.-2-
SectIon2 starts by formulating the benchmark case, where there Is only an
exogenous default penalty. We consider a two—periods example. Borrowing takes place
in period zero; debt repayment Is scheduled for period one. In case of default, a fixed
default penalty is inflicted upon the borrower. There is uncertainty Inperiodzero
regarding the magnitude of the effective default penalty, and debt Issuance occurs
before the resolution of uncertainty.We consider risk—neutral lenders, who chargean
Interest rate that results in an expected yieldequalto an exogenouslygiven
risk—free Interest rate. We review the derivation of the supply of credit, which may
include a backward-bending portion. As was shown in Aizenman (1986), the presence
ofcountry risk introduces adistortion, calling for an optimalborrowing tax. Among
othereffects, the optimal tax eliminates the possibility of an equilibrium on the
backward-bending portion of the supply of credit, We assume that such a tax Is
applied, allowing us to focus our analysis on equilibria on the upward-sloping portion
of the supply of credit.
In section 3 we modify the assumptions of section 2 by allowing for a default
penalty that is contingent upon the default intensity. To permit a comparison across
regimes we design alternative Incentive schemes by varying the responsiveness of
the penalty to the intensity of default, without changing the total.cost applied in
case of a complete default. At the limit our incentivescheme converges to an
exogenousdefault cost regime. The characteristics and the random nature of the full
default penalty (i.e. the penalty associated with complete default) are the same as in
section 2. These assumptionsallow us to derive the dependencyof the supply of
creditonthe elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default intensity. In
generalwe will observe incidences of partial default whose magnitude rises with the
level of borrowing relative to the cost of a complete default. A rise in the
elasticityof the penalty with respect to the default intensity is shown to induce a
higher default rate and and to raise the country risk as reflected in the interest rate
associated with a given borrowing, causing a teitward shiftin the supply of credit.
Section 4conducts a welfare comparisonbetween the regimes elaborated in
sections2and 3. Using the expected welfare of a representative consumer it is-3-
shown that the introduction of partial defaults due to a variablepenalty has adverse
effects. Thus, ourstudgconcludes that variable default schemes that tie the DenaltU
11fle default rate are disadvantageous. We turn then to an assessment of the welfare
effect of plans that make the interest rate contingentupon realization of shocks. In
general. such a contingency plan isadvantageous.For example, Itisshownthata plan
thatwill index the Interest rate such as to correlate it perfectly with thedefault
penaltywill eliminate the adverse effects of country risk on theexpected Income.
Section 5 closes the discussion with Interpretative remarks that tie thediscussion
in section 4 to recent attempts to make the effective interest ratepaid by the
borrowing nation contingent upon Its terms of trade.-4-
2. COUNTRY RISK WITH EXOGENOUS DEFAULT PENALTIES
The purpose of this section is to characterize country risk for the case of a
fixed default penalty. This case will define the benchmark forthe subsequent
discussion.We start bymodeling the supply of credit in the presence of country risk.
Next,we discussthedemand for credit and optimal policies for the borrowingnation.
Thediscussion in this sectionsketchesthe analysis In Aizenman (1986), whereas
sectIon 3extends the frameworkfor the case of endogenous default penalties3.
2.1 The DefaultDecision
Considera two—periods small economy. Borrowing B takes place in period zero
at an interest rate r*, Debt repayment (1+r*) Is scheduled for period one. In case of
default, a stochastic penalty N is inflicted upon the borrower, given by
(I) N:N0/P
The term 'P represents a stochastic disturbance, whose density function is 9.Debt
issuance occurs in period zero, before the resolution of uncertainty re9arding 'P. The
information regarding 'P is summarized by a distribution of'P. which is known to
both the lenders and the borrowing nation. This information is appliedto determine
thesupply of credit. We consider the case where the default decision is arrived at by
a centralized decision maker, like the central bank. While consumers are assumed to
be price takers In the credit market, they are fully aware of the default rule guiding
the central bank. Equation (1) can reflect various economic environments. For
example. let the default penalty be the result of adverse commercial policies (like
banning trade in goods and services). In such a case the term 'P may reflect a
stochasticterm measuring the effectiveness ofthe trade embargo.Alternatively, the
default penalty can be the result of exclusion from future borrowing. Let N be the
futurecost of being excluded from the credit market (in terms of period two) due toa
defaultin period one, and 'P be the effective discount factor that translates the-5-
future penalty (N) into N/'P in terms of period one, Thus, P can be viewedas a
myopia measure, where a higher 'P corresponds to a smaller weight attached to the
future by the decision maker in period one. In such a case the uncertainty regarding 'P
may reflect political uncertainty regarding the horizon of the future decision maker.
Defaultwill take placeif the debt exceeds the penalty, or if
(2) (i+r*)/p
Alternatively, the default rulecan be summarized by:
default if 'P >Z
(3)
no default if'P < Z
whereZ N0/B(1+rw) denotes the marginal value of 'P associated with default.
2.2 The SuDDIy of Credit
We assume a credit market that is dominated by risk-neutral lenders, fully
informed regarding the nature of the decision rule guiding the borrower, as well as
regarding the borrowers indebtedness position4 (i). A risk-neutral lender will extend
credit B at a rate r such that the expected yield on the risky loan equals the
risk-free return:
(4) (i+r) p = 1+rf
where rf is the exogenously given risk-free interest rate, and P Isthe probability of
nodefault. From (4) we infer that-6-
(5)P:fg(P)dP
where 9 isthedensityfunctioncorrespondingto 'P. defIned for'P > c>0.Thus, P Is
a functionof(i+r)E P P((1+r')),withP' <0.Equations (4) and (5) defIne the
credit supply curve, which is determined by the distribution g. wesummarize the
reduced form of the supply of credit by:
(4')r
Notice that a rise in the interest r rate has two opposing effects on the expected
income yield. The direct effect is reflected in the rise of the yield for a given
probability of no default (P). But it also Implies a drop in P. This second effect
works to depress the expected yield, implying that under certain conditions (derived
in Aizenman (1986)) the supply is backward-bending5.
2.3 The Demand for Credit
The demand for credit is derived from the underlying consumer preferences. We
assume that consumers' utility is given by
(o) U u(X8) + pu(x1)
whereis the consumption in period I, and p stands for the subjective rate of time
preference. A representative consumer maximizes his expected utility subject to his
budget constraints. He Is facing an Interest rater.that may differ from the external
interest rate r0 due to the presence of borrowing taxes. The social role of these
taxes will be examined in the sequel. The representative consumer's budget
constraintsare given by-7-
(7) X0:X0+B
(8a) + R1 - 6(1 + r)
(Bb) =-
wherestands for the endowment In period I, R1 for lump-sum transfers in period
one,Xjn is the consumption in case of no default, Xld is the consumption in states
of default and B is the borrowing by the consumer. Equation (7) definesthe budget
constraint for period zero, whereas for period one we observe two possiblebudget
constraints,corresponding to the possibility of no default (8a) and default (8b). To
simplify exposition,we abstract from production, assuming an endowment model
(adding production andinvestment wouldnotchange the main results). Applying the
budgetconstraints to (6)we can characterize the consumer problem as choosing B so
asto maximize expected utility V
Z 00
(9) V u(0 + B)+pfu(1+ R1- B(1 + r))g('P) d'P + pfu(1 - N0/'P)g('P) d'P
z
Optimizing(9) yields the following first—order conditIon
(10) v(x0)/v(x1 )= 1+r




;vO1) pfu1 + R1
-BU + r))g(p)d'P.
Opt imal borrowing B Is chosen by the consumer so as to support a consumptionpath-8-
that yields equality between the ratio of the corresponding expected marginal
utilities of consumption and the interest rate. The assumption that the consumer is a
price taker is reflected in the fact that each consumer treats aggregate borrowing B
(and the corresponding Z and r) as exogenously given.
2.4 Ootimal Policy for a Borrowing Nation
Togaininsight into the potential role of optimal policies let us evaluate the
solution of the optimal consumption path by a centralized decision maker.Potential
deviationsbetween the plannersand the consumers solutions will justify policies
neededto support optimalitg. These policies will be shown to be in the form of
optimalborrowing taxes. Weassume that the transfer R1 is used to rebate consumers
suchthat the net present value of the planners revenue is zero (when the relevant
interest rate from the planners perspective is the external interest rate, re). Subject





with the help of these budget constraints the planners problem isreducedto a choice
ofB that will maximize
z 00
(9) V = u(0++ pfu(1-(' + r*))g(p) d + pfu(1-
N0/'P)g('P)d'P
E Z-9-
Akey difference between the consumer's and the planner's problems is that the
centralized planner is not a price taker In tne credit market, and he is aware mat the
choice of borrowing B will impact on the interest rate via the supply of credit (q).
Consequently. (9') implies that the condition for optimal borrowing is
d109(1+ rw)
(10')V(x0)/v'(x1) (1+rw) (i +
dlog
z
where8V'(x0)u'(X0); v'(x1)=pf u'(1 — (i + r$*))g(P)d'P.
Optimal borrowing B is chosen by the planner so as to support a consumption path
that yieldsequality between the ratio of the corresponding expected marginal
utilities of consumption and the 'social' Interest rate (defined by d log(1 + r*)/ d
log B).A comparison between the planner's and the consumer's solutions reveals that
the two differ inthat the planner applies the 'social' Interestrate, whereas the
consumer applies the 'private' one.inthe absence of borrowing taxes the presence of
countryriskImplies that there is a distortion, and that from the social point of
view the equilibrium is associated with excessive" borrowing because the private
falls short of the social interest rate. This situation provides the rationale for
government intervention. The distortion arises from the factthatindividual
borrowerstreat the rate of Interest as given even though fromthe perspective of the
countryas a whole the rate of interest rises with the volume of borrowing. An
optimal borrowing tax is needed to yield equality between the social and the private
interest rates7. As is shown in Aizenman (1986). the optimal borrowing tax has an
Important consequence —- ruling out inefficient equilibria on the backward—bending
portion of the supply of credit. Henceforth, we will assume that the optimal- 10-
borrowing tax Is applied and therefore we will neglect the backward-bending portion
of the supply of credit. This argument is summarized in Figure One. Curve DD is the
demand for credit, KLMN plots the supply curve, and KIM' corresponds to the 'social
supply' curve (the marginal to KIM). Optimality calls for a borrowing tax,
defined bg the vertical distance between r0 and F(Figure One)8.
3. COUNTRY RISK WITH ENDOGENOUS DEFAULT PENALTIES
Thepurpose of this section is tostudy the role of endogenous penalties, andto
assesstheir desirability. In section 2 we considered the case of a fixed default
penalty, independent of the magnitude of the default. In that case, the borrower faced
an all-or-nothing choice. In this section we allow for a penalty tied to the default
rate. Let us denote by 'r the default rate (8 LLI). With a default tonly a
portion1-r of (Ir) is paid in period one. We assume that a default r imposes
costsof
(ii) for1 2 'r 2 0;where h 2 1.
Notice that his the elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default intensity. It
measures the convexity of the penalty with respect to the default rate --ahigher h
implies higher responsiveness of the penalty to the default intensity. By definition,
the effectivepenalty does notexceed N; and It approaches N as v -'I
(complete default). The specification in (11) is flexible enough to allow assessment
of the positive and normative aspects introduced by the presence of an endogenous
penalty scheme. Varying h will allow us an assessment of the role of endogenous
penalties, where h .Iwill bring convergence to the benchmark case of fixed








(11),we preserve all the other assumptions of section 2, including the distributional
assumptions regarding N (see (I)).
The supply of credit in the presence of endogenous penalties is derived In
several stages. First, we derive the cost minimizing default ratefrom the
borrower's perspective for a given B(1+r).Next,armed with the solution for we
solve for the interest r0 charged by the lenders for credit volume B. we then study
the dependency of the supply of credit on the penalty scheme, as summarized by h.
3.1 The Default Rate
The borrowing nation chooses in period one the default rate 't so as to maximize
the gain in net income attributed to default. The 'default Income', denoted by n(t). is:
(12)yr(r):v'(l÷r')-tN0/'P for Li
It is composed of the benefit of partial default(I+r*)J minus the cost associated
with the default urhN0/I1J, Let us denote bythe default rate that maximizes the
default income. Direct optimization reveals that for h 1
1/(h - 1)
(13) Mm{1I(i + r")/{hNH )
Togain further insight we plot In Figure Two the marginal cost and the marginal
benefitassociated with default t.Optimaldefault is obtained at the intersectionof
the two curves. The Appendix shows that for an internal solution (e << 1) a rise
inh (the elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default intensity) will
increase the default rate. In terms of Fi9ure Two the rise In h is associated with a
rightward shift of the relevant portion of the MC curve. Similarly a drop in the
default penalty will shift the MC curve rightward, thus raising the default rate.







upwards, being associated with a rise In the default rate.
Letus denote by Z the marginal value of 'P associated with a complete default
(r1). From (13) we Infer that
(14) Z hN0/(B(1
+
It is noteworthy that In the caseorhI thedefault decisiondegeneratesto a
simple rule
0 if 'P < N0/IB(j+r')]
(15)
I If 'P > N0/(B(1+r*)J
Equation (15) corresponds to thecaseof a fixed default penalty.ApplyIng (13)
allows us to conclude that as we approach the case of exogenous penalty (h -. 1) the
optimal default rate for an internal solution converges to zero, Thus, as h -, I we
approach the benchmark case of section2, whereIs either zero or one.Weturn now
tothe the derivation of the supply curve, which augments the information regarding
the default rate that has been derived in this section.
3.2The SUDDIy of Credit with Endogenous Penalties
Risk neutral lenders will require interest ratersuch that:
(16) (1+r)( 1— E(fIl+r" ;)) = 1
rf
whereE(I1+r" ;) standsfor the expected default intensity.Debtissuance occurs
before the resolution of the uncertainty regarding 'P. Thus, the lenders will set the
interest rate according to (16). byapplyingthe expected values ofobtained from- 13-
(13),yieldIng:
z 1/(h-1)
(17)E(i)f ((i + r*)/{hNfl g('P) d'P + f g('P) d'P
£ Z
and the implied supply of credit is given by
Z 1/(n-1)
(18) (i+rM)( f{i- [(i+r')/{hN)J )g('P) d'PJ 1+r1
The Appendix evaluates the dependency of the supply schedule on the elasticity of
thepenalty with respect to the default intensity (h). It Is shown that a rise In h
shifts the supply curve leftwards, implying that a given volume of credit will
require a higher interest rate. This result stems from the fact that for a given
Interest rate a higher convexity of thepenalty scneme (d h > 8) implies a higher
default rate, reducing thereby the expected yield on a given volume of indebtedness,
andthus necessitating a rise in the interest rate.
To gain further insight, we now turn to a comparison between the welfare
obtained subject to endogenotis versus fixed penalties. This comparison will enable
us to conclude with normative statements regarding the desirability of each scheme.-14-
4.THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CONTINGENT PENALTIES AND INTEREST RATES
Our discussion in section 3 implies that allowance for endogenous default
penalties is associated with a rise in the country risk, as is reflected by the rise in
the interest rate associated with a given Indebtedness. It is noteworthy that this
observation alone does not suffice to determine the welfare effects of endogenous
default penalties. That Is because the adverse effects of the induced rise in the
interestrate will be partly offset by the rise In the Incidenceofpartial defaults
that are associated with 'default income'.
4.1 EndogenousDefaultPenalties andWelfare
we evaluate the welfare consequences of endogenous penalties by analyzing
their expected utility. Formally, the expected utility associated with a given level of
borrowing B Is given by
z 00
(19)V U(e+ ) +p fu(1 - (i + r)+it)g('P) dl'+pju(X1 - N0/'P)g(P) dl'
whereItand Zare obtained from (12)-(14). ApplyIng(19) we get that9
8v z a(1+r)
(20) — - Ju'(x1)( (1 - E) )g('P) dl'< 0
an an
Consequently, a greater responsiveness of the penalty scheme to thedefault rate
resultsIn a drop in expected welfare. This is because the added degree of freedom
introduced bya variable default cost has the consequence of raising the expected- 15-
default for a given credit volume, necessitating a higher interest rate. The rise in
the interest rate dominates any indirect gains associated withthegreater flexibility
of the default structure.
4.2The Role of Contingencies
The emerging conclusion is that welfare is reduced by making the default
penalty contingent upon the Intensity of defaultThis, however, does not Imply that
contingent prices are not beneficial. In fact, welfare can be enhanced If the interest
rate Is made contingent upon the default penalty ('P). For example, consider the case
of exogenous default penalties (h1). Suppose that the value of 'P is public
information in period one, and that we normalize N0 suchthatthe expected value of
1/'V is one. Let us define a contingent interest rate r('P) by
(21)1 +r = (1+
Recallingthat the default penalty is N0/P. it is evident that I +r*ISdefined to
beperfectly correlated with the default penalty. Applying the decision rule (3) it is
evident that for B <N0/(I
+rf)the contingent interest rate (21) eliminatesthe
consequences of country risk.To verify this point, note that for B <N0/(1 + r)we
observethat for all 'P. (1 + rw)ë<
N0/'4'.With such a contingency pricing no default
willoccur.The proposed scheme Is also feasible because the expected yield is equal
to the risk-free interest rate (E[(1+r)/'PJ = 1+rf ). The expected welfare in such a
system Is given by
(22) V u(0 + ) + p Ju(1 -(i + r*))g(P) d'P- 16-
To gain further Insight into the welfare effect of this scheme consider the case
where consumers are risk neutral. I.e. where the periodic utility u(X) Is linear
(u(X)x). For such an economy a welfare ranking is a comparison of expected Income.
A comparison of (22) and (9') reveals that the gain In expected Income associated
with the contingentinterest-rate schemeIs equal to theexpected penalty
in the non—contingent, exogenous penalty system (given by
J(N0/"P)g('P)d ). The effect of making the interest rate perfectly correlated with the
z
penalty is to eliminate the adverse effects of country risk on the expected Income.
With risk-averse agents the optimal contingency pricing is more complicated, because
It involves also optimal reallocation of the Income risk among the various parties In
an attempt to reduce the volatility of income across states. But even in this case we
will observe welfare gains generated by contingent interest rates.- 17•-
5. CQNCLUDINGREMARKS
Ratherthanrepeatingthe summary from the introduction, we conclude with
Interpretative remarks. Our discussion has focussed on the analysis of the potential
welfareeffects of contingency plans Inthe presence of countryrisk. The analysis
allows us to conclude that contingency plans that make the default costsdependent
upon the intensity of default undertaken by the borrower nation are not
cost-minimizingschemes. At the same time, contingency plans that make the Interest
rate dependent upon observable variables that are correlated with the defaultpenalty
are cost-minimizing schemes. For example, a contingency plan that will make the
interest rate perfectly correlated with the default penalty willfully eliminate the
adverseincome effects ofcountry risk and will eliminate incidencesofdefault for
creditvolumes below the ceiling. it will also have the beneficialby-product of
Increasing the credit ceiling. A necessary condition for the feasibility of such a
system isthat the realization ofthe default penalty should be public information.
One can speculatethat an example of thistype of arrangementisthe recent Mexican
reschedulingplan, whereseveral aspects of debt servicing were made contingent upon
thefuture price of oil. This arrangement can enhance welfare if the defaultcost is
lowin bad states of nature, when the price of exportables is low10. Forsuch an
economy a contingency plan that will index theeffective Interest rate to the
realization of the price of exportables will be beneficial Inreducing the effective
magnitudeof country risk and the incidence of default.- 18-
APPENDIX
Thepurpose of this Appendix is to prove that for an internal solution fora
rise in h (the elasticity of the penalty with respect to the default intensity) will
increase the optimal default rate and will shift the supply of credit leftward.
Direct derivation of (13) reveals that for 0 << I
(A!) -(hlog [(i +r)/{hN)J+h—11
ah (h-I)2
thus,the sign of (Al) is determined bysign{-(hlogi(i + r")/(hN)J+h - 11).Note
thatbecause 0 < 1 equation (13) implies that log t(i + r*)/(hN)j < 0
Consequently,for hI sign{-(h log fi + r*)/{hN)J + Fi-ID is positive. We can
prove that (A!) is positive if we can demonstrate that the expression determining
the sign of (Al) rises with h (because h1). This proof follows from the fact that
(A2)8 - [h log E(i + r)/(hN)J + h - lJ/8h = - log (i + rw)/(hN)J > •
We turn now to the derivation of the effect on the supply curve of a rise in h.
We do so by evaluating the horizontal displacement of the supply schedule induced by
a rise in h. From (18) we get that for a given (I+rw)
8RI+r*)(1_ E(J1+rW ; )) z a ;:
(A3) LB ih (I+r*) f g('P)d'P
88 8h- 19-
Theterm multipiging iB corresponds to the change in expected Uleld induced b a
rise In indebtedness. Direct Inspection of (18) reveals that this change Is negative,
due to the InducedriseIn the expected default rate. The term multiplyln9 Eh is
positive,because weshowed that 8 r/8 h >0.Combining that Information implies
thatholdrng (1 + rw) given
(A4)8B/3h <0.
Therefore, we conclude that a rise in h shifts the supplg schedule leftward.- 20-
FOOTNOTES
1. For a useful study on the debt problem see the World Bank Report (1986). For
studies on country risk, see Harberger (1976, 1980); Eaton and Gersovitz (1981);
Sachs (1984); Kletzer (1984); Edwards (1984.1985); Dornbusch(1985);Eaton(1985);
Krugman(1985); Aizenman (1986).
2. A recent example is the July 22 .1986 agreement between Mexico and the
IMF, where several aspects of debt servicing were made contingent upon the future
priceof oil.
3. For related studies regarding the determination of the supply of credit with
exogenousdefault penalties see Sachs (1984)and Krugman(1985).
4.EquIlibriumIn a market withpartialInformation regarding the volume of
indebtednessis thetopicofKletzer (1984).
5.It can be shown that d log B/d log (1+r*)=(I-1')/1l; where 11 is the
elasticity of P wIth respect to gross indebtedness Ei =—d log P/ d log ë'(l+r*)J.
Consequentity, the supply curve is backward bending if 'r > 1 (for more details see
Aizenman (1986)).
8.In deriving this result we use the factthat V = 0.
7.The percentage optimal borrowing tax can be shown to equal
(i +r*)/(rød log/u log (1r)).
8.It Is noteworthythat as the borrowing nation approaches the inelastic
segmentof the supply of credit (where d B! d (1+r*) -' 0). optimality calls for the
imposition of a dual exchange rate system.This system isequivalent to the
imposition of a quota on borrowing (equal to the borrowing ceiling) and a tax on
borrowing equal to the spread between the domestic interest rate and the supply price
of the credit ceiling. These are the optimal policies if the equilibrium occurs at the
credit ceiling level (for further details see Aizenman (1986)).
9. In deriving (20) we are using the factthatV =0and around the equilibrium
a,t/a(1+rN)=B and 87t/8-r:e.- 21-
10.Several factors can account for low default costs in bad states of nature.
First, the cost of a trade embargo can be lower because of the dropInthe value of
exports.Second, bad states may beassociated with higher myopiaInthe policy maker.
whose survival may beat risk.- 22-
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